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Abstract. Cloud storage as one of the most important cloud services enables
cloud users to save more data without enlarging its own storage. In order to
eliminate repeated data and improve the utilization of storage, deduplication is
employed to cloud storage. Due to the concern about data security and user
privacy, encryption is introduced, but incurs new challenge to cloud data
deduplication. Existing work cannot achieve flexible access control and user
revocation. Moreover, few of them can support efﬁcient ownership proof,
especially public veriﬁability of ownership. In this paper, we propose a secure
encrypted data deduplication scheme with effective ownership proof and user
revocation. We evaluate its performance and prove its security. The simulation
results show that our scheme is efﬁcient and effective for potential practical
employment.
Keywords: Deduplication  User revocation  Homomorphic encryption 
Proxy re-encryption
1 Introduction
Cloud computing provides seemingly unlimited resources as services to cloud users by
rearranging various resources. Cloud storage as one of the most popular cloud services
enables cloud users to store tremendous amount of data in the cloud, which may exceed
their own storage spaces.
In order to improve the storage services, deduplication has become an important
technique in cloud storage. Data deduplication can help eliminate multiple copies of
same ﬁles and improve the utilization of storage. It has proved to achieve high cost
savings, such as reducing up to 68% storage for standard ﬁle systems [1]. The savings
can be passed back to cloud users in many ways, such as reducing storage cost. Thus,
efﬁcient deduplication is extremely desired by both cloud service providers and cloud
users. Though data deduplication brings many beneﬁts, it also faces some challenges.
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First, cloud storage and deduplication management incurs the concern about data
privacy and user privacy [2]. Cloud users would lose the full control over their
out-sourced personal data, which even may be disclosed by the dishonest cloud service
providers. Thus encryption as a popular method is introduced to solve this problem [3].
But the same ﬁle encrypted with different encryption schemes would result in different
ciphertexts, which makes it difﬁcult to check duplication and conduct deduplication.
Second, how to share the duplicated data flexibly to authorized data holders is an issue
[4]. Duplicated data would not be stored again, but it should guarantee the access right
of data holders. Third, data deletion by users complicates the deduplication manage-
ment. If some data holders delete their stored data, their access to the data should be
completely prevented even when they still hold the previous key for obtaining the data.
Thus, deduplication management should support user revocation. Fourth, how to
guarantee the ownership proof of data holders is an open issue [5]. In order to reduce
the communication cost and computation cost caused by duplicated data upload, ﬁle
tag is always employed for duplication check. But it is vulnerable to forgery attack and
difﬁcult to guarantee the ownership.
In order to solve the above problems, this paper presents a flexible encrypted data
deduplication scheme under the cooperation of an Authorized Party (AP) and a cloud
service provider (CSP). First, we propose an Additive Homomorphic Re-Encryption
(AHRE) algorithm. In our deduplication scheme, uploaded ﬁle is encrypted with
symmetric encryption while the symmetric key is encrypted with AHRE. It can efﬁ-
ciently update the ciphertexts and revoke those data holders who delete their data at the
cloud. Moreover, we propose a scheme to prove the ownership without complicated
interactions between data holders and CSP or AP, which can support flexible public
veriﬁability. Different from existing work [6, 7], our scheme can effectively deal with
encrypted data deduplication with revocation at the cloud without involvement of data
owners or data holders. Speciﬁcally, the contributions of this paper are:
• We construct an additive homomorphic re-encryption algorithm, which supports
re-encryption and additive homomorphic computation. It lays the basic foundation
of our proposed scheme for encrypted data deduplication with effective ownership
proof and user revocation.
• We integrate data deduplication with flexible access control based on AHRE, which
results in a secure and efﬁcient encrypted data deduplication.
• We design an encrypted data update and user revocation protocol to enhance data
security. It can refresh the stored data at any time and support the data holder
revocation when it deletes the data. In addition, the above operations do not need
any involvement of data holders.
• We design an efﬁcient ownership proof scheme, which does not incur complicated
interaction between data holders and CSP and can support public veriﬁability.
• We prove the security and justify the performance of our scheme through analysis
and implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of
related work. System model and security model are introduced in Sect. 3, followed by
the detailed design of proposed schemes in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, security analysis and
performance evaluation are given. Finally, we conclude the paper in the last section.
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2 Related Work
Cloud storage service providers such as Dropbox [8], Google Drive [9], Mozy [10],
perform deduplication to save space by eliminating redundancy in cloud storage and
optimizing its utilization. In order to preserve the privacy of data holders, encryption is
employed. However, storage savings through deduplication are totally lost if clients
conventionally encrypt their data. This is because the encrypted data are saved as
different contents by applying different keys, which complicates the deduplication. For
example, DeDu [11] - a deduplication system is unable to handle encrypted data.
Encrypted Data Deduplication
Convergent Encryption (CE) as the most prominent manifestation of Message Locked
Encryption (MLE) was introduced [12, 13]. In CE, a user employs the hash code of
data as the key to encrypt the data, which results in EHðmÞðmÞ. Any user with the same
data can generate the same ciphertext, thus realizing deduplication. However, CE
suffers from offline brute-force dictionary attacks. Moreover, it is hard to support user
revocation. Bellare et al. proposed DupLESS to resist the above-mentioned brute-force
attacks [14] by introducing a Key Server. But it still cannot control data access of other
data users in a flexible way. Wen et al. [15] constructed a session-key-based convergent
key management scheme and a convergent key sharing scheme to overcome the
problem caused by frequently changed ownership and data blocks. But this work
requests all data owners communicate with each other to manage their session key. Liu
et al. proposed a secure cross-user deduplication scheme that supports client-side
encryption without requiring any additional independent servers by applying a pass-
word authenticated key exchange protocol [16]. But this scheme requests that the data
owner is always online for data ownership check and deduplication. Thus this approach
cannot handle the situation that the data owner is not available, which is very common
in practice.
In another work [17], attribute-based encryption (ABE) is applied to realize dedu-
plicated data access control managed by data owners. But it needs the data owners to be
online and incurs much computation cost to them. In our previous work [18, 19], we
proposed deduplication schemes based on proxy re-encryption (PRE). But the
ciphertext update needs the data holders to download the stored ﬁle from the cloud and
then encrypt it, which incurs higher communication cost and computation overhead.
Liu et al. proposed a policy-based deduplication proxy scheme [20], but they did not
consider data deletion. Another work [21] even proposed to forfeit deduplication to
reduce chunk fragmentation by container capping. But all of the above work does not
consider user revocation management. Though the work [7] proposed to solve the
deduplication with user revocation, it complicates the key management of
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) especially during user revocation. Hur et al. pro-
posed a novel server-side deduplication scheme for encrypted data [6]. It allows a cloud
server to control access to outsourced data even when data ownership changes
dynamically by exploiting randomized convergent encryption and secure ownership
group key distribution. This scheme prevents data leakage from revoked users. But it
needs all users to upload their encrypted ﬁles and data owners should be online for user
revocation, which is not efﬁcient.
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Data Ownership Veriﬁcation
Halevi et al. introduced a practical implementation of Proofs of Ownership (PoW) for
deduplication [22]. They proposed to use Merkle tree on the pre-processed data to
generate veriﬁcation information. When challenging a prover, a veriﬁer randomly
chooses several leaves of the tree and obtains the corresponding sibling-paths of all
these leaves. Only when all paths are valid, will the veriﬁer accept the proof. Pietro
et al. [23] chose the projection of a ﬁle onto some randomly selected bit-positions as
proof to realize the PoW. But both schemes above do not consider data privacy. Ng
et al. [24] also applied Merkle tree to manage the deduplication of encrypted data. The
value of each leaf node is generated from several data blocks, while only one leaf is
considered in each interactive proof protocol. Thus, it needs to execute the protocol
multiple times to enhance its correctness, which causes high computation overhead.
Yang et al. proposed an efﬁcient scheme to check the ownership [25]. A data holder
only needs to access partial and dynamical portions of an original ﬁle to generate the
proof of possession. In addition, the data holder has no need to upload the ﬁle, which
can reduce communication and computation costs. In our previous work [19], Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) is employed to verify data ownership by challenging data
holders. The scheme presented in this paper simpliﬁes this procedure, which can
support public veriﬁability of ownership when data holders are offline.
3 Problem Statements
3.1 System Model and Security Model
Our proposed scheme mainly consists of four types of entities as shown in Fig. 1:
(1) Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is in charge of data storage and duplication check.
CSP is curious about user data, but it follows designed protocols strictly in order
to gain commercial beneﬁts from providing storage service to its consumers or
users.
(2) Authorized Party (AP) is responsible for access policy check, re-encryption key
generation, and user revocation by cooperating with the CSP. It would never
collude with the CSP and is fully trusted. AP cannot access the data stored at the
CSP.
Fig. 1. System model
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(3) Data owner is the cloud service consumer and the ﬁrst data uploder. It encrypts an
original ﬁle and uploads it to the CSP. The CSP generates one ﬁle tag based on the
proof message of the data owner.
(4) Data holders are subsequent uploaders, who do not need to encrypt the ﬁle but
need to pass ownership check in order to obtain the access right of the stored ﬁle.
If one user deletes its ﬁle at the CSP, AP and CSP should revoke its privilege on
the ﬁle.
We further assume that communication channels among system entities are secure
and each system entity can be authenticated based on a unique identifer.
3.2 Preliminary and Notations
Preliminary
A simpliﬁed variant scheme [26]: Given two large primes p and q, then n ¼ p  q. Let g
and h be two elements of maximal order in G, where G is the cyclic group of quadratic
residues modulo n2.
Key Generation: The public parameters are n, g and h ¼ gx mod n2 by randomly
choosing a secret value x 2 ½1; ordðGÞ:
Encryption (Enc): Given a message m 2 Zn, random number r is chosen in Zn.
The ciphertext is computed as ½mh ¼ ðT ; T 0Þ ¼ fhrð1þm  nÞ; grg ðmod n2Þ.
Decryption (Dec): Knowing x, m can be obtained as follows:
m ¼ LðT=ðT 0Þxmod n2Þ, where LðuÞ ¼ ðu 1Þ=n.
Notations
Table 1 summarizes the notations used throughout the paper.
Table 1. System notations
Symbols Description
g The system generator that is public
n The system parameter
[m] The ciphertext of data m
L ð Þ The bit length of input data
H() The hash function
e(;) The bilinear pairing: G1  G1 ! GT
v The generator in G1
ðskAP; pkAPÞ ¼ ðb; vbÞ The key pair of AP
ðskCSP; pkCSPÞ ¼ ða; vaÞ The key pair of CSP
ðski; pkiÞ ¼ ðuj; vujÞ The key pair of user j
uKey The updating key for ciphertext refresh
rki!j The re-encryption key from user i to user j
EkðÞ The symmetric encryption under symmetric key k
PrM The proof message generated by data uploaders
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4 Algorithm and Scheme Design
In this section, we ﬁrst combine PRE and homomorphic encryption to obtain a newly
designed AHRE algorithm. Then we propose some schemes to support flexible
duplicated data management based on AHRE.
4.1 Additive Homomorphic Re-Encryption (AHRE)
AHRE lays the technical foundation of deduplication, which can support homomorphic
processing and re-encryption computation. Its detailed design is described below.
System Setup: Let p, q be two large primes. Due to the property of safe primes, there
exist two primes p0 and q0 that satisfy that p ¼ 2p0 þ 1, q ¼ 2q0 þ 1. We compute
n ¼ p  q and choose generator g with order k ¼ 2p0q0, which can be chosen by
selecting a random number z 2 Zn2 and computing g ¼ z2n. The value k can be used
for decryption, but we choose to conceal it and protect it from all parties. In addition,
the system chooses two groups G1 and GT of a prime order with bilinear map e:
G1  G1 ! GT . The system parameters are random generators v 2 G1 and
Z ¼ eðv; vÞ 2 GT . A cryptographic hash function: H: f0; 1g ! Zn is also applied.
Key Generation ðKGenÞ: The CSP and the AP generates their key pairs:
skCSP; pkCSPð Þ ¼ ða; vaÞ and skAP; pkAPð Þ ¼ ðb; vbÞ respectively. User j generates key
pair ðuj; vujÞ.
Encryption ðEncÞ: Any users upload their data to CSP for storage and deduplication
management. User i chooses two random values r1 and r2, and then encrypts its raw
data m with public keys pkAP. The ciphertext of data m is denoted as:
m½  ¼ C1;C2;C3f g ¼ f 1þm  nð ÞgH Zr1ð Þr2 modn2; gr2 modn2; pkr1APg.
Re-Encryption Key Generation ðRKGenÞ: The AP wants to delegate user j by
publishing re-encryption key rkAP!j ¼ vuj=b.
Re-Encryption ðReEncÞ: The CSP computes C03 ¼ e pkr1AP; rkAP!j
  ¼ Zr1uj , and sets
C02 ¼ C2 and C01 ¼ C1. Finally, the CSP forwards fC01;C02;C03g to user j.
Decryption ðDecÞ: Upon receiving the encrypted data, user j can directly decrypt it to
obtain the original data: (1) compute C003 = HððC03Þ1=ujÞ = HðZr1Þ; (2) decrypt to obtain
the raw data m ¼ LðC1=ðC02ÞC
00
3modn2Þ where L uð Þ ¼ ðu 1Þ=n.
Moreover, it can also support ciphertext refresh and additive homomorphism.
Updating Key Issue ðUKIÞ: In case that the CSP wants to update the ciphertext ½m,
AP can generate an auxiliary parameter for the CSP: uKey ¼ gH Zr1ð Þ ¼
gHðeðv
1=b;pk
r1
APÞÞ mod n2.
Ciphertext Refresh ðCipRÞ: The CSP can update the ciphertext with its own secret key
and uKey by: (1) choose random r3 and compute C1 ¼ C1  uKeyr3 mod n2; (2)
compute C2 ¼ C02  gr3 mod n2; (3) C3 ¼ C3.
302 W. Ding et al.
Additive Homomorphism ðAHÞ:With the updating key, the CSP can achieve additive
homomorphic operation over the ciphertext ½m. It simply chooses another data m0 and
computes eC1 ¼ 1þm0  nð Þ  C1 mod n2. Finally, it directly calls CipR to
update eC1;C2;C3
n o
. As a result, we get the ciphertext of ðm0 þmÞ.
4.2 Ownership Check
In order to support deduplication, we ﬁrst present an ownership proof scheme in Fig. 2.
If U1 wants to upload its ﬁle m, then it generates a proof message PrM1 ¼ pkHðmÞ=u1CSP
and forwards it to CSP. Upon receiving the message, the CSP ﬁrst computes a ﬁle tag
with the public key of uploader U1: e PrM1; pku1ð Þ = ZaHðmÞ. It then checks if this tag
has been stored. If yes, it means that the corresponding ﬁle has been kept and the CSP
only needs to record U1 as a data holder. Otherwise, it informs U1 to upload the ﬁle.
The details will be presented in the next section.
Specially, the ownership proof can realize public veriﬁability. AP or any data
owner can check the legality of data holders based on proof message and ﬁle tag. The
ownership check is also applied during re-encryption key generation executed by AP,
which can help prevent the collusion of CSP with unauthorized cloud users.
4.3 Data Deduplication Management
We suppose that data holder U1 stores ﬁle m at the CSP and later U2 wants to store the
same ﬁle. If U2 wants to save the same data to the CSP, then the CSP will cooperate
with the AP to enable U2 to access ﬁle m without uploading ﬁle. Figure 3 illustrates a
brief protocol of encrypted data deduplication and data retrieve based on the AHRE.
The details are presented below (system setup refers to Sect. 4.1):
Step 1 - Original Data Upload: Data holder U1 wants to store ﬁle m at the CSP. It
follows the ownership check above and sends proof message PrM1 to CSP. Upon
receiving PrM1, the CSP ﬁrst computes ﬁle tag ZaHðmÞ and checks if this ﬁle has been
stored. If not, the CSP informs U1 to upload its ﬁle and related ﬁles to CSP for storage.
Fig. 2. The procedure of ownership check
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U1 as the ﬁrst data uploader should encrypt its ﬁle with k1 using symmetric key
encryption, call Enc to encrypt k1. The data package Ek1ðmÞ; k1½  ¼ C1;C2;C3f g;f
ZaHðmÞg is kept by the CSP for data storage and duplication check.
When U2 wants to upload the same ﬁle, it follows:
Step 2 - Duplicated Data Upload: U2 also generates proof message PrM2 ¼ pkHðmÞ=u2CSP
based on its own secret key, while the CSP ﬁnds that e vu2 ;PrM2ð Þ ¼ ZaHðmÞ has been
stored. The CSP directly informs U2 that the data has been stored.
Step 3 - Download Request: The data holder (such as U2) sends its request for
accessing ﬁle m to the CSP. The CSP contacts the AP for re-encryption key generation.
Step 4 - Re-encryption Key Issue: AP checks the legality of data holders through
public veriﬁability. If it does not pass the check, it rejects to provide the re-encryption
key; Otherwise, AP calls RKGen to generate a re-encryption key for authorized data
holder U2: rkAP!u2 ¼ vu2=b. Notably, the failed cases of ownership check can be
broadcasted, which will obviously reduce the reputation of CSP and its beneﬁts.
Step 5 - Data Re-Encryption: CSP calls ReEnc using rkAP!u2 to encrypt k1½  to
generate new key ciphertext for U2: fC01;C02;C03g. Then data packet fC01;C02;C03g and
Ek1ðmÞ are sent back to data holder U2.
Step 6 - Data Retrieve: Upon receiving data packet, U2 decrypts fC01;C02;C03g ﬁrst to
get the symmetric key k1 and then performs decryption to gain the original ﬁle m.
Fig. 3. The procedure of data deduplication management
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4.4 Encrypted Data Update
In some cases, the data holders or owners would like to update the stored data peri-
odically to enhance data security. But in most of existing schemes, the data holders
always need to download the ﬁle and use new keys to encrypt the original ﬁle, which is
time-consuming and causes high communication cost. In order to solve this problem,
we propose the following scheme to update encrypted data without user interaction.
The ciphertext update request may occur in two cases (See Fig. 4) and lead to
different operating procedures, which are presented as follows:
Scheme 1 - First ciphertext update request: In this case, it is the ﬁrst update initiated
by the CSP or data holders over the stored data fEk1 mð Þ; k1½  ¼ C1;C2;C3f gg.
The CSP randomly chooses key k2 to further encrypt the ciphertext of ﬁle m. In
order to optimize the management of keys, we concatenate two keys in a secure way.
The CSP ﬁrst scales k2 by 2LðkÞ where LðkÞ is the largest length of symmetric keys, and
calls AH to get the ciphertext of ðk1þ 2L kð Þk2Þ. It keeps the packet fEk2ðEk1ðmÞÞ;
cipK 0 ¼ ½k1þ 2L kð Þk2g and keeps k2 secret in its storage.
Scheme 2 - Follow-up update request: In this case, the ciphertext update is requested
after ﬁrst ciphertext update request, which is over the ciphertext fEk2ðEk1ðmÞÞ; cipK 0 ¼
½k1þ 2L kð Þk2g. The CSP follows the steps below:
(a) Use k2 to decrypt the ciphertext Ek2ðEk1 mð ÞÞ;
(b) Choose a random number k3, and compute ðn 2L kð Þk2þ 2L kð Þk3Þ;
(c) Call AH to get the ciphertext of ðk1þ 2L kð Þk3Þ: cipK 00 ¼ k1þ 2L kð Þk3
 
;
(d) Update its stored packet with fEk3ðEk1ðmÞÞ; ½k1þ 2L kð Þk3; k3g.
Fig. 4. Procedure of encrypted data updating
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4.5 User Revocation Management
If use i deletes their storage in the cloud, the ciphertext update as described above is not
secure enough since it cannot prevent the access of user i if it has kept some previously
secret keys. Thus, we further design a secure scheme to really block the access from
these revoked users.
Similar to the ciphertext update, the user revocation also falls into two types:
Scheme 3 – Revocation before ciphertext update (See Fig. 5): Some user deletes its
storage of ﬁle m without any update on its ciphertext Ek1 mð Þ. In this case, this revo-
cation can be completed through the following steps:
(a) CSP chooses a random number r3, and calls AH to get cipK ¼ ½k1þ r3; ﬁnally,
cipK is sent to AP;
(b) The AP decrypts cipK to get ðk1þ r3Þ, calls Enc to encrypt ðk1þ r3Þ with newly
chosen randoms to get cipK 0 ¼ k1þ r3½  ¼ fð1þðk1þ r3Þ  nÞgHðZ
r0
1 Þr02 mod n2;
gr
0
2 mod n2; Yr
0
1g; in addition, it calls UKI to generate a new updating key
uKey0 ¼ gHðeðv1=y;Yr
0
1 ÞÞ ¼ gH Zr
0
1
 
mod n2. Then, the data packet fcipK 0; uKey0g is
sent back to the CSP.
(c) The CSP directly updates its ciphertext with a new symmetric key k4 to get the
new packet fEk4ðEk1ðmÞÞ; ½k1þ 2L kð Þk4g.
Scheme 4 – Revocation after ciphertext update: In some cases, data holder deletes
its storage after ciphertext update. Hence, the CSP executes user revocation over
ciphertext fEk2ðEk1ðmÞÞ; ½k1þ 2L kð Þk2g.
(a) The CSP chooses a random r4; then it calls AH to get cipK ¼ ½k1þ r4þ 2L kð Þk2;
ﬁnally, cipK is sent to AP.
b) Similar to the step b) above, the AP chooses random numbers r01 and r
0
2, and then
get fcipK 0 ¼ ½k1þ r4þ 2L kð Þk2 ; uKey0g.
(c) Upon receiving the data packet, the CSP decrypts Ek2ðEk1 mð ÞÞ with k2 and
chooses random key k5 to get Ek5ðEk1 mð ÞÞ; then it calls AH to remove r4 and
Fig. 5. Procedure of user revocation caused by user deletion
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update k2 with k5 to get a new ciphertext key cipK 00 = ½k1þ 2L kð Þk5. It updates its
storage with new ciphertexts fEk5ðEk1ðmÞÞ; ½k1þ 2L kð Þk5g.
Through the schemes above, CSP ﬁnally block unauthorized users’ access without
the need of the intervention of data holders or data owner.
5 Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation
5.1 Security Analysis
Our scheme provides a secure approach to realize the deduplication management. The
security of the proposed scheme is guaranteed by the security of the AHRE algorithm.
Thus, we mainly concentrate on the security proof of AHRE and the ownership check.
Assumptions
Deﬁnition 5.1. Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: Given g 2 G and y ¼ gx (x 2 Zq ),
it is hard to get x.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Computational Difﬁe-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given a group G and
group element v, and vx and vy, it is hard to compute the value of vxy.
Proposition 1. If the CDH problem holds, then it is hard for adversaries to pass the
ownership proof without the original ﬁle even when it colludes with CSP.
Proof. We prove it by contraction. For this purpose, we assume that the adversary can
pass the ownership proof without the real ﬁle. Our goal then is to use A to construct an
algorithm to solve the CDH problem.
Given the challenge public parameters (v; Z; eð; Þ), the adversary A can construct its
own key pair (uA; vuA ). If it colludes with CSP, then the adversary can further get
pkHðmÞ=u1CSP , v
HðmÞ=u1 and ZHðmÞ of real data holder u1 from CSP. The adversary can
compute to get its own proof message pkHðmÞ=uACSP ¼ vaHðmÞ=uA on the pkHðmÞ=u1CSP ¼
vaHðmÞ=u1 and vu1 . The adversary can generate real proof message vaHðmÞ=uA , and easily
gain vaHðmÞ with its own secret key.
Here, we set vx ¼ vaHðmÞ=u1 and vy ¼ vu1 , thus it means the adversary gets vxy ¼
vaHðmÞ and breaks the problem of CDH. Hence, our ownership proof is secure and can
guarantee that only real data holders can pass the proof. In addition, anyone can verify
the ownership of data holders with proof message and ﬁle tag.
Proposition 2. If the DL problem holds in group G1 and the CDH problem holds in
group Zn2 , then the AHRE is secure.
Proof. Given the AHRE ciphertext of data m under the secret key of CSP:
m½  ¼ C1;C2;C3f g ¼ 1þm  nð ÞgH Zr1ð Þr2 mod n2; gr2 mod n2; pkr1AP
 
, the adversary A
would like to obtain the original data m.
Due to the difﬁculty of DL problem, it is hard to get vr1 from pkr1AP ¼ vbr1 . Hence,
the adversary cannot obtain the value of H Zr1ð Þ. In the update process, the updating
key gH Z
r1ð Þ is issued to CSP. If the adversary colludes with CSP, it can get packet
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( C1;C2;C3f g ¼ 1þm  nð ÞgH Zr1ð Þr2 mod n2; gr2 mod n2; pkr1AP
 
; gH Z
r1ð Þ). But due to
CDH problem, the adversary cannot get gH Z
r1ð Þr2 from the packet and cannot obtain the
original data.
Proposition 3. The cooperation of CSP and AP without collusion guarantees that only
eligible data holders can access the original ﬁle m and the ﬁle can be deduplicated
securely.
Proof. The adversary has no way to obtain the original ﬁle m even when it colludes
with CSP as it is always in an encrypted form. The ﬁle m is encrypted with symmetric
encryption (such as AES) while the symmetric key is encrypted with AHRE. Owing to
the security of AHRE, the symmetric key is protected and unauthorized users cannot
get it. Moreover, original data conﬁdentiality is guaranteed by symmetric encryption.
Hence, only the authorized users can decrypt ciphertext of keys to further obtain the
original ﬁle.
The ownership proof helps check the legality of cloud users without reducing the
conﬁdentiality of original data. The re-encryption key issue further transforms the
ciphertext under the secret key of AP to another one under the secret key of authen-
ticated data holders. It helps control the access to the ciphertext. In addition, the
ciphertext of original ﬁle is kept by the CSP, thus the AP can only control the
ciphertext of symmetric key.
In the ciphertext update, a random number is introduced to mask the original
symmetric key, which can make sure neither CSP nor AP can get the symmetric key.
5.2 Computation Complexity
The proposed scheme involves four kinds of system roles: data owner, CSP, AP, and
data holder. To present the computation complexity in details, we adopt AES and
AHRE. As the encryption over the uploaded data is unavoidable, we neglect the
symmetric encryption. Due to the limitation of paper length, we analyze the complexity
of deduplication presented in Sect. 4.3 as below:
Data Owner: It needs to do one hash, one modular exponentiation in duplication
check, and two modular exponentiations and two exponentiations over group G1 or GT
to upload its data to the CSP. Thus, its computation complexity is O 1ð Þ.
CSP: CSP performs one pairing to compute the ﬁle tag for duplication check and one
pairing for re-encryption with regard to each data holder’s data upload. Thus, its
computation complexity is OðNÞ, where N is the number of data holders.
AP: It conducts one pairing for duplication check and one exponentiation over group
G1 for re-encryption key generation. Thus, its computation complexity is O Nð Þ.
Data Holder: It also needs one modular exponentiation in duplication check. In order
to get the data, it should do one exponentiation over GT , one hash and one modular
exponentiation. Thus, its computation complexity is O 1ð Þ.
Besides the computation above, they all need to generate one key pair for them-
selves, which involves one exponentiation over G1. Table 2 lists the computation of all
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entities. We also compare it with our previous work [18, 19]. We can observe that our
scheme incurs a little higher computation cost during data upload and data retrieval
process but enables more functionalities, such as public veriﬁability and user revoca-
tion. In addition, it simpliﬁes ownership challenge and reduces the communication
costs caused by ciphertext update or user revocations. In our scheme, CSP and AP only
need to exchange the ciphertexts of keys. The ciphertext of original ﬁle is always kept
and updated by CSP without any involvement of data owners or data holders, which
saves the communication cost, especially for multimedia data.
5.3 Performance Analysis
System Setting
In this section, we further implemented the proposed schemes and tested their per-
formances to check with our theoretic analysis and prove its correctness. The evalu-
ations are performed on a laptop with Intel Core i5-3337U CPU 1.8 GHz and 8 GB
RAM with Java Paring-Based Cryptography library (jPBC). To achieve better accu-
racy, we tested each algorithm 1000 times and reported the average value of all testing
results. We choose AES as the symmetric key encryption. Unless particularly speciﬁed,
some parameters in our tests are set as default values: (1) L nð Þ ¼ 1024 bits; (2) bilinear
pairing parameters generator - TYPE A; (3) length of random numbers – 500 bits;
(4) length of symmetric key – L kð Þ ¼ 128 bits.
Performance of AHRE
As AHRE is applied to encrypt symmetric key, we only evaluate its performance over
data with L mð Þ = 128bits. The computation time of each algorithm in AHRE is pre-
sented in Table 3. Through tests, one pairing in jPBC library can be computed in
approximately 10.1 milliseconds (ms). From the simulation results, we can observe that
the encryption is a little time-consuming but the decryption is very efﬁcient, which is
acceptable for cloud users as they only need to execute it once. Moreover, if the cloud
users are subsequent data holders, they do not need to execute encryption.
Table 2. Computation complexity of each entity by comparing with previous work [18, 19]
Entity Algorithm Computations [our scheme] Computations [19] Computations [18]
Data
owner
Setup 1 * Exp 1 * PointMulti + 1 * Exp 1 * ModInv + 1 * ModExp
Data upload 2 * Ex + 2 * ModExp 2 * ModExp + 1 * PointMulti 3 * ModExp
Csp Re-encryption 1 * Pair 1 * Pair 1 * Pair
Duplication check 1 * Pair – –
Data
holder
System setup 1 * Exp 1 * PointMulti + 1 * ModExp 1 * ModInv + 1 * ModExp
Duplication check 1 * ModExp 2 * ModExp + 1 * PointMulti –
Data upload – – 3 * ModExp
Data retrieval 1 * Exp + 1 * Hash + 1 * ModExp 1 * ModExp 1 * ModExp
AP System setup 1 * Exp 1 * ModExp 1 * ModExp
Ownership check and rekey
generation
1 * Exp + 1 * Pairing 2 * ModExp + 2 * PointMulti 1 * ModExp
Notes: Pair: Bilinear Pairing; Exp: Exponentiation in G1 or GT ; ModInv: Modular Inversion; ModExp: Modular Exponentiation; N: Number of
data holders; PointMulti: Point multiplication in ECC
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Performance of Our Proposed Schemes
In this experiment, we test the performance of our proposed schemes by testing their
simulation time over different size of original ﬁles: 10 MB, 30 MB and 50 MB. As
some basic operations are similar to the operations of AHRE and are not affected by the
size of ﬁles, we only present the computation time varying with the size of original ﬁle,
which is shown in Table 4.
We can observe that the ciphertext update and user revocation almost double the
decryption time of users. But it does not involve the data holders in the two operations.
In most of existing schemes, the data holders need to download the outsourced ﬁle,
decrypt the ciphertext and then re-encrypt them, which is not efﬁcient, especially for
large ﬁles, such as multimedia data. Though revocation and update introduce much
computation overhead, they are almost undertaken by the CSP, which is acceptable for
a cloud service provider.
Table 3. The computation time of each algorithm in AHRE (Unit: ms)
Algorithm System Setup KGen Enc RKGen ReEnc Dec UKI CipR AH Pairing
Time 89.81 13.04 38.82 13.9 10.01 4.08 25.5 13.46 14.02 10.1
Table 4. The computation time of some operations in deduplication schemes (Unit: ms)
Operation Time
File size:
10 MB
File size:
30 MB
File size:
50 MB
Data upload (User) 82.1 317.9 618.1
Decryption before update or
revocation (User)
55.78 300.7 589.7
Update Scheme 1 (CSP) 62.2 298.1 581.8
Scheme 2 (CSP) 117.6 619.4 1210.1
Revocation Scheme 3 Step 1
(CSP)
13.7 13.8 13.8
Step 2
(AP)
80.5 82.5 78.7
Step 3
(CSP)
67.6 314.7 591.3
Scheme 4 Step 1
(CSP)
13.6 14.0 12.3
Step 2
(AP)
79.8 82.7 76.6
Step 3
(CSP)
124.9 600.7 1202.0
Decryption after update or revocation
(User)
104.8 608.7 1182.9
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6 Conclusion
Data deduplication helps improving the utilization of cloud storage and in turn helps
reducing the storage cost of cloud users. In this paper, we proposed a flexible data
deduplication scheme with effective ownership proof and user revocation. Our scheme
can flexibly support outsourced data update and data sharing among data holders.
Moreover, it can support public veriﬁability of ownership and user revocation without
intervention of data owners, which greatly enhances cloud data security and effectively
reduces the communication cost caused by ciphertext update, especially signiﬁcant for
large ﬁles. Extensive performance analysis and test shows that our scheme is secure
and efﬁcient. Although our scheme incurs a little higher computation cost than some
existing work, it can provide advanced features. In future work, we will optimize our
design and study privacy-preserving and veriﬁable data deduplication.
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